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It is not possible at this time, if ever it will be, adequately to com-
memorate Harold Lasswell. The intellectual heritage he has left us is
too great and too various, and his dedicated, pioneering, omnicom-
petent, and compassionate presence is still too recently and too intensely
among us.
Lasswell, a prime mover in the "behavioral revolution" in political
science at the University of Chicago, was an occasional guest lecturer,
under the auspices of Thurman Arnold, Edward Sapir, and John
Dollard, at the Yale Law School in the early 1930s when American
legal realism was first breaking upon the scene. He accepted an ap-
pointment as Visiting Sterling Lecturer, and joined with me in teach-
ing a graduate seminar upon "Property in a Crisis Society" in the late
1930s when many scholars were beginning to seek a more constructive
jurisprudence than either American legal realism or the positivism
that it had debunked. He became a full-time member of the faculty
shortly after World War II at a time when the horrors of that war had
made clear to all the need for both a better law and a better theory
about law, and remained on the faculty, under various titles of distinc-
tion, until his retirement in 1970. During those years, he developed
his ideas about jurisprudence, international law, and criminal law,
teaching with colleagues such courses as "Law, Science, and Policy,"
"The Public Order of the World Community," "Criminal Law and
Public Order," "Communication and Law," and "Case Presentation
and Negotiation."
The importance of Lasswell's many contributions to multidisciplin-
ary inquiry about man in society has been long and widely recognized.
For him there were no barriers between the different disciplines or
sciences. He worked effectively, commonly in collaboration with highly
regarded specialists, in most of the relevant disciplines and assisted in
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the creation of some of the more important newer disciplines. He was
president of two learned societies, the American Political Science As-
sociation and the American Society of International Law, and was
honored by many others. One reviewer described him as a "one-man
university" whose "competence in, and contributions to, anthropology,
communications, economics, law, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry,
and sociology are enough to make him a political scientist in the model
of classical Greece."' The same reviewer added: "The innovations and
scope of his research, the fertility of mind and fluency of style, the
freedom from pomposity and cant, the throw-away generosity with
ideas and insights, make him unique among contemporary scholars."'2
Lasswell's deepest personal commitment was to the creation of a com-
prehensive theory for inquiry about the individual human being in
social process. His goal was to develop a theory which could be made
sufficiently precise to facilitate performance of all the different in-
tellectual tasks necessary to the rational clarification and implementa-
tion of individual and community policy. To this goal all his particular
innovations, including his work in relation to communications research,
the psychiatry of decisionmaking and the psychopathology of politics,
developmental constructs and futuristics, content analysis, the specifica-
tion of a theory of values, the collection of trend data and the social
planetarium, systems theory, functional as contrasted with conventional
analysis, free association as an instrument of thought, and configurative
thinking, were but ancillary. His self-imposed demand was for the
most comprehensive map possible; he would tolerate no rug under
which the indolent could sweep alleged "externalities." The culmina-
tion of all his particular emphases and innovations came, thus, in his
conception, and in measure creation, of what he dubbed, and is now
widely known, as "the policy sciences." The degree to which he suc-
ceeded in fulfilling his commitment is perhaps best indicated by the
terms of an award made to him in 1960 by the American Council of
Learned Societies:
Harold Dwight Lasswell, master of all the social sciences and
pioneer in each; rambunctiously devoted to breaking down the
man-made barriers between the social studies, and so acquainting
each with the rest; filler-in of the interdisciplinary spaces between
political science, psychology, philosophy, and sociology; prophetic
in foreseeing the Garrison State and courageously intelligent in
trying to curb its powers; sojourner in Vienna and selective trans-
mitter of the Freudian vision to his American colleagues; disci-
I. Book Review, 44 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 167, 167 (1970).
2. Id.
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plined in wide-ranging inquiry; working against resistance to create
a modem quadrivium of the social sciences that will make them
truly liberal arts.
3
Lasswell's contributions to law, and especially to theory and pro-
cedures for inquiry about law, are scarcely less monumental, though
as yet less well recognized. He was not a member of the bar, but in a
functional sense he was a great lawyer, even in giving advice about
particular cases. For him law was, in a tradition extending back into
antiquity, a process of authoritative decision by which the members of
a community clarify and implement their common interests. As such a
process, law was but a component part of the broader process of effec-
tive power that Lasswell had long studied as a political scientist. Hence,
it was only natural that he should seek to bring the broad conceptions
of an emerging policy science to bear upon the creation of a juris-
prudence, or theory of inquiry about law, that would be sufficiently
comprehensive, and sufficiently detailed, economically to locate au-
thoritative decision in the larger social processes by which it was af-
fected and which it in turn affected.
It was in his insistence upon a deliberate focus on the formation and
implementation of policy that Lasswell made perhaps his most im-
portant contribution to theory for inquiry about law. Sociological
jurists had concentrated upon the factors affecting, and the conse-
quences of, authoritative decision without offering any systematic or
precise way of talking about either causes or consequences. The
American legal realists had demonstrated that technical legal rules and
concepts are not the only factors affecting decision and had intensely
demanded certain heterogeneous and uncoordinated reformist goals,
with little indication of how authoritative decision might best be
changed to achieve such goals. Lasswell insisted that authoritative
decision-as always a response to events in social process, as always
affected by other events in social process, and as in turn always having
consequences for the future distribution of values in social process-
inevitably embodied a choice among alternative community policies.
Rationality requires, therefore, that both scholars and decisionmakers
be as explicit as possible about the fundamental values to which they
are committed and make the clarification and implementation of these
values a deliberate and central focus of attention. Thus, our first
collaboration, published in this Journal, was an effort to add a con-
structive dimension to legal realism. In it, he wrote: "if legal educa-
3. Am. Council of Learned Societies Citation (Jan. 20, 1960), rePrinted in H. LASSWiELL,
POWER AND PERSONALITY (Compass Books ed. 1962) (back cover).
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tion in the contemporary world is adequately to serve the needs of a
free and productive commonwealth, it must be conscious, efficient, and
systematic training for policy-making."
' 4
The values Lasswell postulated for determining the content of pre-
ferred policies were of course those today commonly characterized as
the basic values of human dignity, or of a free society. To give empirical
meaning to the common value categories of ethical philosophers and
other normative specialists, he added the institutional analysis of cul-
tural anthropologists and came up with an itemization of basic values
and constituent practices that could be made both comprehensive and
detailed in any necessary degree. At the core of the fundamental
preferences to which he was committed and which he recommended to
others, however, was respect for the autonomy and freedom of choice
of the individual human being. Once when we were designing a
frontispiece for a book on the law of outer space, he insisted that we
draw a map with the individual human being as the center of the
universe and with ever expanding concentric circles of celestial bodies
and galaxies extending out from him (or her). More recently he in-
sisted that respect for the dignity of man, by which he meant reciprocal
tolerance and honoring of freedom of choice about participation in the
shaping and sharing of all values, be made the central theme of a book
on human rights. This book is now being published posthumously.5
Another important contribution made by Lasswell to theory for in-
quiry about law was his emphasis upon configuration or contextuality.
Though man was at the center of the universe, he was a member of
interpenetrating, concentric communities of interdetermination, ex-
panding out from the locality to the farthest reaches of an earth-space
community. Because of contemporary technology and other factors,
interdependence in the shaping and sharing of values both charac-
terized each particular community and transcended all communities.
In situations of scarce resources and competitive demands for values,
authoritative decision had of necessity to choose between values. Ra-
tionality in decision required, therefore, the calculation, within the
limits of economy, of the different costs and benefits to all the in-
dividuals and communities involved, with an appropriate integration
or accommodation in common interest.
Still another important contribution by Lasswell was his emphasis
upon problem-solving and the relevance of a variety of intellectual
4. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943).
5. M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (forthcoming 1979).
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skills. For him a problem was a disparity between goals and achieve-
ment; meaningful problem-solving was dedicated to removing such
disparities. Effective problem-solving could not be achieved by syntactic
derivation alone, but required the detailed specification of preferred
policies, the study of comparable past trends in decision and context,
investigation of the factors affecting decision and context, the projec-
tion of possible future developments, and the invention and evaluation
of new alternatives in decision and decision processes. The whole of
Lasswell's comprehensive framework of theory for inquiry about law
was designed to facilitate the more effective and economical per-
formance of these different tasks or skills. Many of his earlier innova-
tions-in such areas as to the psychiatry of decisionmaking, the projec-
tion of developmental constructs, and the specification of functional
categories for describing social process-bear directly upon the im-
proved performance of various particular tasks.
Lasswell's contributions to the policy sciences and to law have been
made largely through his publications, including more than 30 books,
some 250 articles and countless other papers, and through his influence
upon particular individuals. As a teacher, he was occasionally a superb
lecturer, but did not care for the large class and characterized the
Socratic method, so dear to the contemporary law school, as "calculated
mutual insult." His great gifts for teaching found their best expression
in small seminar groups and in one-to-one consultations; in such situa-
tions he was without peer among the teachers whom I have known. His
whole life was a life of the mind directed toward action. He had no
time for trivia, but took a deep interest in all students or colleagues
whose primary concern was for enlightenment and action in the com-
mon interest. For reasons beyond my comprehension, he once described
collaboration with me as comparable to being stabled with a dragon;
yet his patience was infinite, and it has been among the deepest satis-
factions of my life that our association and friendship endured for
forty-three years.
For some, Lasswell could be a rather reserved and aloof, even for-
bidding, figure. He could be sharp of tongue and was not easily
flattered. For many, however, as for me, he was a warm, magnanimous,
spontaneous, and delightful friend. He was fun to work with and fun
to play with; his very presence created intellectual excitement. Almost
by indirection he could assist friends better to understand themselves,
others, and the larger configuration of events about them. He also
had the ability to teach us both to aspire beyond our grasp and how to
extend our grasp. For many of us his loss is not merely grievous; it is
irreparable. Our best solace is, as one friend has put it, that we can be
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grateful for what was, without mourning for what might yet have been.
It has been suggested by one observer that Lasswell's works will be
read as long as there are people who cherish and pursue the world-
wide achievement of human dignity.6 If this prophecy is rationally
based, then Lasswell's influence and memory could endure for a very
long time. Lasswell himself was appropriately confident of the long-
term importance of his contribution and, despite an occasional expres-
sion of dire forebodings, reasonably optimistic about the prospects of
human dignity. In our initial article he struck a characteristic note:
One of the basic manifestations of deference to human beings is to
give full weight to the fact that they have minds. People need to be
equipped with the knowledge of how democratic doctrines can be
justified.... No democracy is even approximately genuine until
men realize that men can be free; and that the laborious work of
modem science has provided a non-sentimental foundation for the
intuitive confidence with which the poets and prophets of human
brotherhood have regarded mankind. . . . There is no rational
room for pessimism about the possibility of putting morals into
practice on the basis of what we know, and know we can know,
about the development of human personality.
7
A more recent statement of this conviction is even more assured:
It is impossible to contemplate the present status of man without
perceiving the cosmic roles that he and other advanced forms of life
may eventually play. We are, perhaps, introducing self-awareness
into cosmic process. With awareness of self come deliberate forma-
tion and pursuit of value goals. For tens of thousands of years, man
was accustomed to living in relatively local environments and to
cooperating on a parochial scale. Today we are on the verge of
exploring a habitat far less circumscribed than earth. The need
for a world-wide system of public order-a comprehensive plan of
cooperation-is fearfully urgent. From the interplay of the study
and practice of cooperation we may eventually move more wisely,
if not more rapidly, toward fulfilling the as-yet-mysterious po-
tentialities of the cosmic process."
It is indeed a remarkable intellectual legacy that Harold Lasswell
has left to those of humankind, present and future, who cherish human
dignity. In such a legacy there are at least the whisperings of the only
kind of immortality that we can know.
6. Rogow, Preface to POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY X (A. Rogow ed. 1969). A further evaluation of Lasswell appears in Marvick,
Introduction to H. LASSWELL, ON POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 1-72 (D. Marvick ed. 1977).
7. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 4, at 225 (emphasis in original).
8. H. LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 242 (1963).
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